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ABSTRACT: The "easy" problem of cognitive science is explaining how and why 
we can do what we can do. The "hard" problem is explaining how and why we 
feel. Turing's methodology for cognitive science (the Turing Test) is based on 
doing: Design a model that can do anything a human can do, indistinguishably 
from a human, to a human, and you have explained cognition. Searle has shown 
that the successful model cannot be solely computational. Sensory-motor robotic 
capacities are necessary to ground some, at least, of the model's words, in what 
the robot can do with the things in the world that the words are about. But even 
grounding is not enough to guarantee that -- nor to explain how and why -- the 
model feels (if it does). That problem is much harder to solve (and perhaps 
insoluble).
Alan Turing made countless invaluable and eternal contributions to knowledge -- the 
computer, computation, limits of provability, neural nets, the Turing test, breaking the 
Enigma code that helped save the world from Nazi tyranny -- before unspeakable 
injustice and ingratitude ended his short life.
I want to enlarge on just one thread in all he has done: The Turing Test set the agenda 
for what later came to be called "cognitive science" -- the reverse-engineering of the 
capacity of humans (and other animals) to think.
What is thinking? It is not something we can observe. It goes on in our heads. We do it, 
but we don't know how we do it. We are waiting for cognitive science to explain to us 
how we -- or rather our brains -- do it.
What we can observe is what we do, and what we are capable of doing. Turing's 
contribution was to make it quite explicit that our goal should be to explain how we can 
do what we can do by designing a model that can do what we can do, and can do it so 
well that we cannot tell the model apart from one of us, based only on what it does and 
can do. The causal mechanism that generates the model's doing-capacity will be the 
explanation of thinking, intelligence, understanding, knowledge -- all just examples of, 
or synonyms for: cognition.
Turing actually formulated (what eventually came to be called) the Turing Test (TT) 
somewhat differently. He called it the "Imitation Game," and in order to rule out any 
bias that might influence our judgment because of the way the TT candidate looked -- 
rather than just what it could do -- the test was to be purely verbal, via the exchange of 
written messages, with the candidate out of sight. Today we would say that the test had 
to be conducted via email: Design a system that can communicate by email, as a pen-
pal, indistinguishably from a human, to a human, and you have explained cognition.
Questions arise: (1) Communicate about what? (2) how long? (3) with how many 
humans?
The answers, of course, are: (1) Communicate about anything that any human can 
communicate about verbally via email,  (2) for a lifetime, and (3) with as many people 
as any human is able to communicate with.
This is a tall order, and it still leaves open the fourth question: (4) How? The answer, of 
course, will be to design the winning model, and cognitive science is nowhere near 
being able to do that, but there is a sub-question about what kind of system the winning model will be.
Many people have assumed that Turing had meant and expected the TT-passer to be 
a purely computational system. Computation, as Turing taught us, is the manipulation 
of symbols (e.g., 0's and 1's, but they could also be words) on the basis of purely 
formal rules that operate only on the shapes of the symbols, not their meaning (i.e., 
syntax, not semantics). 
An example of such a formal, shape-based rule is: IF YOU READ "1 + 1  =" THEN 
WRITE "2". 
You don't need to know what "1" or "+" means in order to follow that rule. You just need 
to know what to do with the shapes. 
That's computation. And that's basically what a "Turing Machine" (the abstract 
precursor of the computer) does.
But did Turing really mean that he thought cognition would turn out to be just 
computation? The "computationalists" among contemporary cognitive scientists think 
cognition is just computation, but I don't think Turing did. The Turing Test as he 
described it was just an email pen-pal test: only symbols in and symbols out. That 
does leave the possibility that the only thing needed in between, to successfully pass 
the test, is symbol-manipulation (computation).
But the philosopher, John Searle showed, with his famous "Chinese Room" thought-
experiment, that this cannot be true: cognition cannot be just computation. For if just a 
computer program were enough to pass the Turing Test, Searle himself could show 
that that would not generate understanding in the system that was passing the Turing 
Test: 
Searle asks us to suppose that the Turing Test (TT) is conducted in Chinese (Chinese 
email, with real Chinese pen-pals). Now since computation is just rules for 
manipulating symbols based on their shapes, not their meanings, Searle himself could 
memorize and execute that same TT-passing computer program, yet he would not be 
understanding Chinese. But then neither would the computer that was executing the 
TT-passing program. Hence cognition is not just computation.
What is missing to make symbols meaningful, the way words and thoughts are 
meaningful to us? I've dubbed this the "symbol grounding problem": Consider a 
Chinese-Chinese dictionary. It defines all the words in Chinese. But if you don't 
already know at least the meaning of some Chinese words, the definitions of the 
meaningless symbols only lead to more meaningless symbols, not to meaning. Some 
of the symbols, at least, have to be "grounded" in what the symbols denote directly, 
rather than just via meaningless, formal verbal definitions.
Consider the symbol string "'zebra' = 'horse' + 'stripes'." To be able to understand that 
definition, you have to already know what "horse" and "stripes" mean. And that can't go 
on via just definitions all the way down ("stripes" = "horizontal" + "lines," etc.). Some 
words have to be grounded directly in our capacity to recognize, categorize, 
manipulate, name and describe the things in the world that the words denote. This 
goes beyond mere computation, which is just formal symbol manipulation, to 
sensorimotor dynamics, in other words, not just verbal capacity but robotic capacity.
So I do not believe that Turing was a computationalist: he did not think that thinking 
was just computation. He was perfectly aware of the possibility that in order to be able 
to pass the verbal TT (only symbols in and symbols out) the candidate system would 
have to be a sensorimotor robot, capable of doing a lot more than the verbal TT tests 
directly, and drawing on those dynamic capacities in order to successful pass the 
verbal TT.
But although Turing was not a computationalist about cognition, he was nevertheless 
a computationalist in the more general sense that he believed that just about any 
physical, dynamical structure or process (including planetary motion, chemical 
reactions, and robotic sensorimotor dynamics) could be simulated and approximated 
by computation as closely as we like. This is called the physical version of the 
"Church-Turing" Thesis (CT). (The mathematical version of CT is the thesis that Turing's formal definition of computation -- the Turing Machine -- can do anything and 
everything that mathematicians do when they "compute" something.)
The physical CT does not imply, however, that everything in the physical world is just 
computation, because everyone knows that a computer simulation of (say) a plane, is 
not a plane, flying (even if it can simulate flying well enough to help test and design 
plane prototypes computationally, without having to build and test them physically, and 
even if the computation can generate a virtual reality simulation that the human senses 
cannot distinguish from the real thing -- till they take off their goggles and gloves).
So Searle is simply pointing out that the same is true of computational simulations of 
verbal cognition: If they can be done purely computationally, that does not mean that 
the computations are cognizing.
Computations cognizing? What on earth does that mean? Well, to answer that 
question, we have to turn to another philosopher: Descartes. How does Searle know 
that he is not understanding Chinese when he is passing the Chinese TT by 
memorizing and executing the TT-passing computer program? It is because it feels 
like something to understand Chinese. And the only one who knows for sure whether 
that feeling (or any feeling at all) is going on is the cognizer -- who is in this case 
Searle himself.
The contribution of Descartes' celebrated "Cogito" is that I can be absolutely certain 
that I am cognizing when I am cognizing. I can doubt anything else, including what my 
cognizing seems to be telling me about the world, but I can't doubt that I'm cognizing 
when I'm cognizing. That would be like doubting I'm feeling a toothache when I am 
feeling a toothache: I can doubt whether the pain is coming from my tooth -- it might be 
referred pain from my jaw -- I may not even have a tooth, or a mouth, or a body; there 
may be no outside world, nor any yesterday or tomorrow. But I cannot doubt that what 
it feels like right now is what it feels like right now.
Well Searle is not feeling the understanding of Chinese when he passes the Chinese 
TT. He can distinguish real understanding (as he understands English) from just going 
through the motions: just doing the doing.
But where does this leave Turing's test, then, which is based purely on doings and 
doing-capacity, indistinguishable from the doing capacity of real, cognizing human 
beings?
Turing was perfectly aware that generating the capacity to do does not necessarily 
generate the capacity to feel. He merely pointed out that explaining doing power was 
the best we could ever expect to do, scientifically, if we wished to explain cognition. 
The successful TT-passing model may not turn out to be purely computational; it may 
be both computational and dynamic; but it is still only generating and explaining our 
doing capacity. It may or may not feel.
Explaining how and why we can do what we can do has come to be called the "easy" 
problem of cognitive science (though it is hardly that easy, since we are nowhere near 
solving it). The "hard" problem is explaining how and why we feel -- the problem of 
consciousness -- and of course we are even further from solving that one.
In commemoration of Turing's 2012 centenary the Cognitive Sciences Institute of 
Universite du Quebec a Montreal is hosting a 10-day Summer Institute on the 
Evolution and Function of Consciousness (plus a 3-day practical workshop on 
measuring consciousness) from June 29 to July 12 in Montreal. Over 50 computer 
scientists, roboticists, neuroscientists, biologists, psychologists and philosophers 
(including John Searle, Dan Dennett, Antonio Damasio, Joseph Ledoux and Simon 
Baron-Cohen) will present the current state of the art in the attempt to give a causal 
explanation of how and why we feel rather than just do. For those who cannot attend in 
person, the videos of most of the talks will be available on the web as of the day after 
each presentation.
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